We show whether central clearing of a particular class of derivatives lowers counterparty risk. For plausible cases, adding a central clearing counterparty (CCP) for a class of derivatives such as credit default swaps reduces netting efficiency, leading to an increase in average exposure to counterparty default. Clearing two or more different classes of derivatives in separate CCPs always increases counterparty exposures relative to clearing the combined set of derivatives in a single CCP. 2 among many clearing participants across a single class of underlying assets, such as credit default swaps. The introduction of a CCP for a particular class such as credit derivatives is only effective if the opportunity for multilateral netting in that class dominates the resulting loss in bilateral netting opportunities across uncleared derivatives from other asset classes, including uncleared OTC deriatives for equities, interest rates, commodities, and foreign exchange.
A central clearing counterparty (CCP) stands between over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives counterparties, insulating them from each other's default. Effective clearing mitigates systemic risk by lowering the risk that defaults propagate from counteparty to counterparty. Clearing also reduces the degree to which the solvency problems of a market participant are suddenly compounded by a flight of its OTC derivative counterparties, as occurred when Bear Stearns' solvency was threatened.
We show whether central clearing for a particular class of derivatives reduces counterparty exposures and collateral demands. For plausible cases, adding a new CCP dedicated to only one class of derivatives, such as credit default swaps (CDS), reduces netting efficiency, thereby increasing average exposure to counterparty default, or increasing collateral demand, or both.
We show that it is always more efficient to have a single CCP that jointly clears among many clearing participants across a single class of underlying assets, such as credit default swaps. The introduction of a CCP for a particular class such as credit derivatives is only effective if the opportunity for multilateral netting in that class dominates the resulting loss in bilateral netting opportunities across uncleared derivatives from other asset classes, including uncleared OTC deriatives for equities, interest rates, commodities, and foreign exchange. Dealer A is exposed by $100 million to Dealer B through a CDS, while Dealer B is exposed to Dealer C for $100 million on the same CDS, and Dealer C is simultaneously exposed to Dealer A for the same amount on the same CDS, then a CCP eliminates this unnecessary circle of exposures. The introduction of a CCP therefore involves an important tradeoff between bilateral netting without the CCP and multilateral netting through the CCP. Naturally, our results show that introducing a CCP for a particular set of derivatives reduces average counterparty exposures if and only if the number of clearing participants is sufficiently large relative to the exposure on derivatives that continue to be bilaterally netted. For plausible parameters, we show that it is far from obvious that this condition is met for the separate clearing of credit default swaps.
The benefits of a central clearing counterparty dedicated to credit derivatives has been significantly reduced through the aggressive use of compression trades, which has lowered exposures in the CDS market to about half of their mid-2008 levels. Proposals by European regulators to have one or more CCPs dedicated to clearing European credit default swaps could further reduce the netting opportunities of a CCP, relative to combining the clearing of CDS in a single CCP.
We provide numerical examples of the impact of this proposal on expected counterparty exposures.
Working with twelve prominent CDS dealers, ICE Trust (U.S.) has cleared $3.5 trillion notional of index-based CDS contracts in the United States, as of January 2010.
3 According to DTCC data, the total notional amount of standard The interoperability of CCPs, by which at least some of the benefits of joint clearing can be obtained through agreements among CCPs and their participants, can in principle achieve significant reductions in counterparty risk, although obtaining effective interoperability agreements currently presents a number of legal and financial engineering challenges, in addition to business-incentive hurdles.
For related discussions of interoperability, see EuroCCP (2010) and Kalogeropoulos, Russo, and Schönenberger (2007) .
I. Netting Efficiency in an OTC Market
We consider N market participants, whom we shall call "entities," whose overthe-counter derivative exposures to each other are of concern. These N entities may also have exposures to other entities.
We consider the opportunity for the N entities to novate some OTC derivative positions to a central clearing counterparty. For example, if entities i and j have a CDS position by which i buys protection from j, then both i and j can novate to a CCP, who is then the seller of protection to i and the buyer of protection from j. Novation to a CCP is sometimes called "clearing," although the term "clearing" is often used in other contexts.
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We allow for K classes of derivatives. These classes could be defined by the underlying asset classes, such as credit, interest rates, foreign exchange, commodities, and equities. One can also construct derivatives classes by grouping more than one underlying asset type.
For entities i and j, let X k ij be the net exposure (when positive) of i to j of all positions in some derivatives class k, before considering collateral. By definition,
Before setting up a CCP, this exposure X k ij is uncertain because the level of exposure that will exist on a typical future day is yet to be determined. The uncertainty in X k ij also includes the risk associated with marks to market that will occur before additional collateral can be requested and received. If entity j defaults and X k ij > 0, then entity i loses X k ij on positions in asset class k, before considering the benefits of netting across asset classes, collateral, and default recovery.
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For now, we suppose that all exposures (X k ij ) are of the same variance and are independent across asset classes and pairs of entities, excluding the obvious case represented by (1). We later relax all of these assumptions. For simplicity, we assume symmetry in the distributions of exposures across all pairs of entities.
This implies in particular that E(X k ij ) = 0. We will also relax the symmetry assumption. With N entities and K asset classes, there are K × N × (N − 1)/2 exposure distributions to be specified. Symmetry allows a dramatic reduction in the dimension of the problem.
A reasonable measure of the netting efficiency offered by a market structure is the average, across entities, of total expected counterparty exposures, after netting, but before collateral. The lower is this average, the more efficient is the netting arrangement. Before considering the introduction of a CCP, the netting efficiency is
where we have used symmetry by fixing attention on a particular entity i. Assuming normality, we have
where σ is the standard deviation of X k ij .
For given collateralization standards, the risk of loss caused by a counterparty default is typically increasing in average expected exposure. (Under normality and symmetry, essentially any reasonable risk measure is increasing in expected exposure.) Risk of loss from counterparty default is a first-order consideration for systemic risk analysis.
Going beyond counterparty default risk, as expected exposures go up, the expected amount of collateral that must be supplied goes up. Collateral use is expensive. In an OTC market without a CCP, whatever collateral is supplied by one counterparty is received by another, so the net use of collateral is always zero.
The need to supply collateral is nevertheless onerous, for several reasons. First, some individual counterparties on a given day will supply more collateral to others than others supplied to them. The net drain on the assets that could be supplied as collateral is costly, because of the lost opportunity to use that collateral for secured borrowing, as a cash management buffer, or for securities lending as a rent-earning business. Second, there is a question of the timing of collateral settlement. One must often supply collateral to a particular counterparty on a given day before collateral is received from another counterparty. If this were not the case, for instance, there would be no specials in treasury repo markets.
This sort of frictional demand for collateral, analogous to the demand for money that arises from a limited velocity of circulation of money, is considered by Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (2002) . So long as the average cost of supplying collateral to others is larger, on average, than the average benefit of receiving collateral from others, a market with poorer netting efficiency is also a market with higher net cost of collateral use. 
II. Netting Efficiency with a CCP
We consider the implications of a CCP for one class of derivatives, say Class K.
Taking the previously described setting, suppose that all positions in Class K are novated to the same CCP. The expected exposure of entity i to this CCP is
In practice, the exposure of a clearing participant to a CCP has two components.
The first part is the direct exposure to the failure of the CCP, as to any other counterparty. We have explicitly modeled this source of exposure. The second part of the exposure to the CCP is indirect, in the form of new contributions by the entity to the CCP guarantee fund that are payable in the event that one or more other members of the CCP fail. The latter exposure depends in part on the CCP rules for collateral, guarantee funds, and default management. 6 We have not modeled these indirect exposures. Our measure of netting efficiency is thus likely to be somewhat biased in favor of clearing.
The expected exposure of entity i to the other N − 1 entities for the remaining K − 1 classes of derivatives is ϕ N,K−1 . Thus, with a CCP for one class of derivatives, the average entity expected exposure is 
Normally, a CCP does not post as much collateral to its counterparties as it receives from them. Thus, the comparison (4) overstates the benefits of a CCP from the viewpoint of collateral efficiency. In Appendix A, we allow for correlations across derivatives classes, and show that the benefit of introducing central clearing increases with cross-class exposure correlation. We also point out that counterparties have an incentive to create exposures with each other that are negatively correlated across asset classes, in order to hedge their counterparty risks.
It could be argued that the exposure of an entity to a CCP is likely to be of less concern than its exposure to another entity, because a CCP is likely to be well regulated, bearing in mind the systemic risk posed by the potential failure of a CCP. We do not model this "benefit" of a CCP; our average expected exposure measure weights all counterparty exposures equally. Arguing the other way, the centrality of a CCP implies that its failure risk could be more toxic than that of other market participants. 7 Likewise, we do not consider this effect. For a more comprehensive review of policy issues regarding OTC derivatives market infrastructure, see Duffie, Li, and Lubke (2010) and European Central Bank (2009).
Our measure of netting efficiency is based on the total of the expected exposures of an entity to its counterparties. This measure does not consider concentra-tion risk. Even putting aside the systemic risk of a CCP caused by its centrality, a CCP tends to represent a concentration of exposure to its counterparties. In our simple setting, this is true whenever the number of entities clearing one of the classes of derivatives is greater than the number of derivatives classes, that is N > K. Specifically, the expected exposure of an entity to its CCP, as a multiple of that entity's expected exposure to each of its other counterparties,
. For instance, if there are N = 10 entities and K = 5
classes of equally risky derivatives, then after novation of positions in one class to a CCP, the expected exposure of an entity to the CCP is 50% more than its exposure to any other counterparty.
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A. Derivatives Classes with Different Degrees of Risk
We now generalize by considering the netting efficiency allowed by the central clearing of a class of derivatives that may have particularly large exposures, relative to other classes of derivatives. That is, we now allow the expected exposure
] of class k to be different than that of another class. Our other assumptions are maintained. A class could include derivatives with more than one underlying asset type. For example, we could group together all CDS and all interest rate swaps into a single class for clearing purposes.
Suppose that derivatives in Class K are under consideration for clearing. The ratio of an entity's expected exposure with a given counterparty in this asset class to the total expected exposure with the same counterparty in all other classes 8 When comparing instead to the expected exposure to a counterparty that existed before novation to a CCP, this concentration ratio is √ (N − 1)/K, which is 1.34 in our example. This represents a 34% increase in concentration due to "clearing," under our simple assumptions. For N = 20 entities and K = 5 classes of derivatives, the corresponding increase in concentration is 94%.
combined is
For example, if all classes have equal expected exposures, then R = 1/ √ K − 1, using the fact that expected exposures are proportional to standard deviations.
If Class-K exposures are twice as big (in terms of expected exposure) as each of the other K − 1 classes, then R = 2 √ 1/(K − 1). A calculation analogous to that shown previously for the symmetric case leads to the following result.
Proposition 1 The introduction of a CCP for a particular class of derivatives leads to a reduction in average expected counterparty exposures if and only if
where R is the ratio of the pre-CCP expected entity-to-entity exposures of the class in question to the expected entity-to-entity exposure of all other classes combined.
For example, we can take the case of N = 12 entities, the number of entities that partnered with ICE Trust to create a CCP for clearing credit default swaps. Table I . Although these data merely show gross current credit exposures, and therefore do not incorporate the add-on exposure implications of risky marks to market, they do give a rough indication of the relative amount of exposure in each of the major underlying asset classes, before netting and collateral. The effect of bilateral netting reduced the total gross exposures shown in Table I from $25.4 trillion to $3.7 trillion, but because of the manner in which these data are collected, the net exposures do not include the effects of credit default swaps held by non-U.S. dealers.
In light of Proposition 1, it would be hard to base a case for the netting benefits of a central clearing counterparty dedicated to credit default swaps on the magnitudes of OTC derivatives credit exposures shown in Table I . Credit derivatives account for only about 12% of the total gross exposures. If one assumes that total counterparty expected exposures of a given dealer are proportional, class by class, to the gross credit exposures shown in Table I , and that X k ij are independent across k, the implied ratio R of expected exposures on credit derivatives to expected exposures on the total of other classes would be about 10 19%. This 10 To calculate the implied ratio R, denote by Z k the total gross exposure on derivative of class k, for k = 1, 2, . . . , K. Assume that the total expected counterparty exposure on class k is a fixed fraction α of Z k , and that these expected counterparty exposures are independent across k. Without loss of generality, let class K be centrally cleared while all remaining classes are bilaterally netted. Then the implied ratio of total expected counterparty exposure on class K to that on classes 1 to K − 1 combined is 
12
The data in Table I suggest that there would be a much stronger case for the joint clearing of CDS and interest rate swaps, which together accounted for about 73% of the total gross exposures. Indeed, interest rate swaps on their own represent large enough exposures to justify a dedicated central clearing counterparty, and a significant fraction of interest rate swaps are already cleared through CCPs.
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Ironically, our model suggests that it is easier to justify the netting benefits of a central clearing counterparty dedicated to a particular class of derivatives after a different CCP has already been set up for a different class of derivatives.
In this sense, "one mistake justifies another." For example, the threshold size of the CDS market that justifies the netting benefits of a CDS-dedicated CCP is lowered once a significant fraction of interest rate swaps are cleared.
One could argue that CDS exposure is rather special, because of jump-todefault risk and because default risk tends to be correlated with systemic risk.
Given the typical practice of daily re-collateralization, the revaluation of CDS 11 According to a press release by Markit of July 2, 2008, a compression trade "involves terminating existing trades and replacing them with a far fewer number of new 'replacement trades' which have the same risk profile and cash flows as the initial portfolio, but with less capital exposure. The initiative, available to both the U.S. and European CDS markets, will be managed jointly by Creditex and Markit and has the support of 13 major CDS market participants." See "Markit and Creditex Announce Launch of Innovative Trade Compression Platform to Reduce Operational Risk in CDS Market," July 2, 2008, at www.markit.com.
12 See http://www.dtcc.com/products/derivserv/data/index.php. 13 According to a February 3, 2009 press release on its web site, LCH.Clearnet stated that it clears about 50 percent of the OTC global interest rate swap market in a CCP for interest rate swaps. However, Duffie, Li, and Lubke (2010) provides a lower estimate of 35% for dealer-to-dealer clearing based on a survey of dealers by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. U.S.-based CCPs for interest rate swaps include CME Cleared Swaps and IDGC. Ledrut and Upper (2007) provide details on the central clearing of interest rate swaps.
positions caused by any defaults on a given day would need to be extremely large in order to build a strong case for separate CDS clearing on the implications of jump-to-default risk. Our results show that jump-to-default risk is better reduced through bilateral netting or joint clearing with interest rate swaps, unless the jump-to-default risk is large relative to that of all other OTC derivatives exposures. Of the total of $2,987 billion in gross credit exposures shown in Table   I incorporates both the effect of market value on a typical future date (which is uncertain from the current perspective), as well as the effect of volatility of changes in market value between that day and the time by which additional collateral could partially be collected before the counterparty fails. We also assume that the exposure of dealer i to dealer j on class k is proportional to S k j .
Thus the standard deviation of the pre-collateral pre-clearing exposure of dealer i to dealer j on derivatives class k is
14 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency does not provide notional amounts by the underlying asset classes, such as interest rate, credit, equity, and so on. However, we note that almost all swap contracts are interest rate swaps, and that almost all credit derivatives are credit default swaps. For that reason we use the notional amounts of swaps contracts as proxies for those of interest rate swaps, and the notional amounts of credit derivatives as proxies for those of CDS. We let α k be the fraction of notional positions in derivatives of class k that are centrally cleared. Keeping our normality and independence assumptions, we have
The expected exposure of Dealer i to a CCP dedicated to class-k derivatives is
The expected exposure of Dealer i to Dealer j on all uncleared positions is This table shows the expected counterparty derivatives exposures of dealers under various clearing approaches, as multiples of total exposures when all classes are bilaterally netted. "Mult." refers to the case of multiple CCPs, each clearing one class of derivatives. "Same" refers to the case of a single CCP clearing all derivative classes considered. The estimates are based on N = 12 dealers, the six dealers of Table II and six others with the same exposures class-by-class. The standard deviation scaling m k for non-interest-rate-swap derivatives is assumed to be three times that for interest rate derivatives.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) use a standard-deviation scaling m k for non-interest-rate-swap derivatives that is three times that for interest rate derivatives.
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Relative to the no-clearing base case, the introduction of a CCP that clears
100% of credit derivatives actually increases market-wide expected exposures by
15 From BIS data as of June 2009, the market value of interest rate swaps is roughly 3.5% of the notional amounts. The market value of all the other derivatives classes combined is about 5.9% of the notional amounts. These numbers suggest a ratio of roughly 1.67 to 1 for the current valuations of non-interest-rateswaps to interest rate swaps, per unit notional. We scale up from 1.67 to 3 in order to allow for the volatility of changes in market value between the time of valuation and the time by which additional collateral could be received before a potential default. about 5% in this setting (Column 2), as suggested by our theory. If a CDSdedicated CCP clears 75% of CDS, then expected exposures are about 3% higher than for the case of fully bilateral netting (Column 4).
If we divide CDS positions into two classes, say "European" and "U.S.," of equal total notional sizes, then clearing the U.S. and European CDS separately increases expected exposures by 9%, relative to bilateral netting (Column 3). 
III. Netting Efficiency with Multiple CCPs
In this section, going beyond the illustrative estimates of Section 3.3, we prove a general result on the loss of netting efficiency caused by dedicating different CCPs to each of several classes of derivatives, as opposed to the joint clearing of various classes of derivatives in a single CCP.
We drop our normality and symmetry assumptions, and allow for an arbitrary joint distribution of X k ij . We suppose that C of the K classes of derivatives are centrally cleared, while the remaining K − C classes are bilaterally netted.
Without loss of generality, classes 1, 2, . . . , C are cleared through CCPs. The expected exposure of Entity i on uncleared derivatives is
With a single CCP that clears all of the first C classes, the total expected exposure of Entity i is
With the separate clearing of the first C classes of derivatives, the expected exposure of Entity i to the C different CCPs is instead
using the convexity of max( · ) and Jensen's inequality. That is, each entity has higher expected counterparty exposure with multiple CCPs than with a single CCP. This result formalizes the intuition of the example given in Section 3.3.
Proposition 2 ) .
In Appendix B, we examine the case of separate CCPs for two groups of market participants. We show that whenever introducing a unique CCP for all market participants strictly reduces counterparty exposures, it is always more efficient to have one CCP than separate CCPs for each group of market participants.
IV. Conclusion
We show that the central clearing of one class of derivatives such as credit default swaps may reduce netting efficiency, leading to higher expected counterparty exposures and collateral demands. When multiple derivatives classes are cleared, it is always more efficient to clear them on the same CCP rather than on different
CCPs. An obvious policy recommendation is a move toward the joint clearing of standard interest rate swaps and credit default swaps in the same clearing house.
Appendices
A Cross-Class Exposure Correlation
We now allow for the possibility that derivatives exposures are correlated across asset classes. For simplicity, we suppose that the correlation ρ between X For entity-to-entity exposures, it would be reasonable to assume that ρ is small in magnitude, bearing in mind that this correlation depends in part on whether the exposure between i and j in one particular derivative contract is likely to be of the same sign as that of its exposure in another. For pairs of dealers with large matched-book operations, one might anticipate that ρ is close to zero.
The average total expected exposure without a CCP is
With a CCP for Class-K positions only, the average total expected exposure
The reduction in average expected exposure due to the introduction of a CCP for one class of derivatives is therefore
Proposition 3 The introduction of a CCP for one class of derivatives reduces the average total expected exposure of an entity if and only of
where
This result follows from the fact that
Rearranging terms, we have the result. 
Because dealers may have a tendency, especially when their counterparties are distressed, of entering derivatives trades that offset exposures arising in other classes of derivatives, we believe that extra emphasis should be placed on the case of negative ρ.
17 For a fixed number N of entities, as the number K of derivatives classes gets large, β K converges to √ ρ, for ρ > 0. Thus, in this sense of increasingly many classes of derivatives, or more generally as the expected exposure in the class to be centrally cleared becomes small relative to that in other classes of derivatives, a CCP is asymptotically efficient if and only if ρ > 1/(N − 1). We calculate, treating N as though a real number, that
The convexity of θ(N, K) with respect to N is evident from Figure 2 .
B Separate CCPs by Entity Groups
In this appendix we consider the cost of having two CCPs, each dedicated to a particular group of entities, for the same class of derivatives. This separation of
CCPs is different from that in Section III.. We return to our original assumption of independence of exposures across classes of exposures. We assume that the entities are partitioned into two groups for separate clearing, Group A with M entities and Group B with N − M entities. We allow for the possibility that entities within a group have higher exposures with each other than they do with entities in the other group. Specifically, if entities i and j are in different groups, while i and n are in the same group, we let
be the ratio of cross-group expected exposures to within-group expected exposures. We will always assume, naturally, that q ≤ 1. Our assumptions are otherwise as before.
With the introduction of CCPs for Class-K derivatives, one for each group, we suppose that all entities continue to bilaterally net exposures on the remaining K − 1 classes, that they clear Class-K derivatives within their own group, and that they continue to bilterally net exposures on Class-K derivatives with those counterparties that are not in their own group. The total expected exposure of an entity in Group A, for instance, is therefore
For M = N/2, with N even, the average total expected entity exposure (in both groups) is
Similarly, with only one CCP, the average total expected entity exposure is
We let Θ(N, K, M ) be the reduction in expected exposures associated with two CCPs, over using one CCP for the same class of derivatives for all entities.
For the case of M = N/2, we calculate that
For M = N/2, having two CCPs is more efficient than having one CCP if and only if
Without any CCP, the expected exposure is
Provided M = N/2, a unique CCP for all Class-K derivatives reduces average expected exposure, relative to no CCP, by
Having a single CCP for all entities improves efficiency, relative to having none, if and only if
Comparing (10) and (11), for equally sized groups of entities, one can show that whenever introducing a unique CCP for all entities strictly improves efficiency, it is always more efficient to have one CPP than to have separate CCPs for each group of entities. This implication can also be observed in Figure 3 . 
